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CASE NOTES
FUTURE OF DITCH-WIDE CHANGE CASES IN
COLORADO: REDUCING PER-SHARE WATER
QUANTITIES WITH HISTORICAL CONSUMPTIVE
USE DETERMINATIONS BASED ON UNLAWFUL
ENLARGEMENT AND AVERAGE RESERVOIR
RELEASES: BURLINGTON DITCH RESERVOIR &
LAND CO. V. METRO WASTEWATER
RECLAMATION DIST., 256 P.3D 645 (COLO. 2011)
DAVID W. BAKER
I. INTRODUCTION
Transfer of agricultural (irrigation) water rights to municipal and industrial uses is one way water providers can meet the needs of a growing
population in Colorado.' A water right owner's ability to change a water
right adds value to that right and is sometimes the only way for it to generate economic benefits for the owner. Scarcity of water supply and climate change variations in rainfall and snowmelt timing threaten to reduce
the available water supply across the entire state.' In the future, more
farmers may look at cashing in on their valuable water rights. This case,
however, is an example of the perils of submitting water rights to the scrutiny of opposing parties and how Colorado courts apply the no injury
rule, which requires senior water right holders to prevent injurious

*
With thanks to Bill Paddock, Partner, Carlson Hammond & Paddock, L.L.C.,
for review and comments.
1. See The Municipal & Industrial Water Supply and Demand Gap, COLORADO

WATER CONSERVATION BOARD, http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/water-supply-

planning/Pages/TheWaterSupplyGap.aspx (explaining that the Colorado Statewide Water Supply initiative includes agricultural transfers as one way to address increasing water
demands).
2.
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Change,
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BOARD,

("Current climate
http://cwcb.state.co.us/environment/climate-change/Pages/main.aspx
models project that Colorado will warm by 2.5*F by 2025 and 4'F by 2050.") (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011); Iris T. Stewart et al., Changes in Snowmelt Runoff Timing in Western
North America Under a "Business as Usual" Climate Change Scenario, 62 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 217, 230 (2004), available at http://meteora.ucsd.edu/cap/stewartsclch.pdf
(explaining earlier peak snowmelt and warmer temperatures will affect evaporation rates
in reservoirs and limit water available for beneficial use in dry months).
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changes in stream conditions for the benefit of junior appropriators.'
Potential transferors must take into account the real risks inherent in the
court's requantification of their water rights that is part of every change of
water rights proceeding.
Here, the Colorado Supreme Court clarified how it applies the
measure of historical beneficial use to the one-fill rule for water storage
rights in Colorado that, in turn, may impact how storage right owners
exercise their water storage rights. The court also excluded long-term
practices and private agreements from its calculation of historical consumptive use. Further, the applicants' ditch-wide methodology for determining historical use effectively resulted in a re-quantification of all
remaining shares relying upon the same water rights in the ditch company, even though many of its shareholders never applied for a change of
use. As a result of this case, shareholders in other mutual ditch companies may oppose those shareholders who wish to change water rights in
the ditch based upon a ditch-wide analysis because of the resulting
requantification on a per-share basis and potential reduction of all shareholders' water rights.

II. BACKGROUND
A. PARTIES TO THE CASE

This case was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for
Water Division No. I ("water court"). The appellants ("applicant below")
Farmers Reservoir and Iriigation Company ("FRICO"), Burlington
Ditch, Reservoir and Land Company ("Burlington"), Henrylyn Irrigation
District ("Henrylyn") (collectively "Companies"), the United Water and
Sanitation District ("United"), and East Cherry Creek Water and Sanitation District ("ECCV") appealed the water court's interpretation of the
lawful uses of water under the decrees at issue, historical consumptive
use, its analysis of the one-fill rule, and the effect of new diversion and
transportation structures on the appellants' rights to divert water from the
South Platte River.' The opposer-appellants took issue with parts of the
water court's decree, but were not aligned on every issue because of the
broad scope of the issues before the water court, so they separately argued on an issue-by-issue basis.' Those parties included the City of
Thornton ("Thornton"), the City of Englewood ("Englewood"), the City
of Brighton ("Brighton"), the City and County of Denver ("Denver"), the
Engineer for Water Division No. I ("State Engineer"), the City of Aurora
("Aurora"), the Central Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Cen3. See Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629,
631 (1954) ("[Jlunior appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream
conditions as they existed at the time of their respective appropriations.").
4. Id. at 653.
5. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist.,
256 P.3d 645, 654 (Colo. 2011).
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tral"), and the Public Service Company of Colorado d/b/a Xcel Energy
("Public Service").'
In 2003, ECCV, FRICO, and United entered into an agreement to
implement the multi-million dollar United ECCV Water Supply Project.
FRICO agreed to change the type and place of use of water rights represented by shares in the Burlington Ditch and Barr Lake systems that the
Companies diverted from the South Platte River. The water rights at
issue were the 1885 Burlington Ditch water rights and 1908 and 1909
FRICO water rights currently used for irrigation below Barr Lake.
FRICO was to change the water rights so that United could augment
ECCV's well field depletions to the South Platte water in the Beebe Draw
north of Barr Lake and also send water directly into ECCV's system.'
The applicants sought to quantify the historical use of these water rights
using a ditch-wide methodology." The augmentation plan itself was not at
issue on appeal."
B. BURLINGTON BARR LAKE SYSTEM

For a basic understanding of the entire water diversion, storage, and
delivery system at issue, the court went through the history of the Burlington Barr Lake System. Burlington's original appropriation began in
1885, with an adjudication date of 1893 for a 350 cfs direct flow water
right from the South Platte River and a storage right in Barr Lake and
Oasis Reservoir, filled at a rate of 350 cfs from the same source." Presently, the Burlington Barr Lake System consists of the original Burlington
Canal, now the Little Burlington Canal, the Burlington O'Brian Canal
("Burlington Canal"), and Barr Lake, which is a combination of Barr and
Oasis Reservoirs." The two canals divert at the same point on the South
Platte River near the Adams County line, and carry diverted water in the
same canal running northwesterly, before eventually separating." The
Little Burlington Canal delivers water to irrigators above Barr Lake, while
the Burlington Canal runs into Barr Lake." Before the Burlington Canal
reaches Barr Lake, it delivers water into the Denver Hudson Canal,
which delivers the water into the Henrylyn system." Below Barr Lake, a
series of lateral ditches carry water from the reservoir to the irrigated

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 655; see Concerning Application for Water Rights of Midway Ranches
Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc. in El Paso & Pueblo Cntys., 938 P.2d 515, 526 (Colo. 1997)
(validating previous ditch-wide determination of historical consumptive use per-share as
controlling future augmentation plans absent changed circumstances).
9. Burlington Ditch Reservoir& Land Co., 256 P.3d at 655.
10. Id. at 656.
11. Id. at 655.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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lands." Before FRICO's involvement, the East and West Burlington Extension canals were the primary ditches below Barr Lake." FRICO subsequently improved and expanded the ditches into the current Speer and
Neres Canals to serve additional irrigated acreage below Barr Lake with
water from the system."
In 1909 FRICO first contracted with Burlington for its water rights
in excess of those rights . . . to fill Barr Oasis . . . and used for direct

irrigation."' After that contract, FRICO enlarged the Burlington Canal
and its headgate and introduced an additional 150 cfs into the system that
it applied to acreage below Barr Lake." FRICO also separately adjudicated water rights from the South Platte River with a direct flow right of
600 cfs and 900 cfs for storage in Barr Lake between 19.1 and 34 feet
with a 1908 and 1909 priority date respectively."
. In 1921, the Companies agreed to share water within the Burlington
Barr Lake system." Under the agreement, the first 200 cfs of 1885 direct
flow water was sent to the shareholders in the Little Burlington System
above Barr Lake, and the remaining water was split at the Denver Hudson Canal, with half going to Henrylyn and the rest to the FRICO shareholders."

III. SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all of the water court's findings
and limitations on historical consumptive use for the direct flow and storage water rights within the Burlington Barr Lake system. The court reviewed the water court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard and reviewed the water court's legal conclusions and interpretation of
prior decrees de novo.'
A. DETERMINATION OF HISTORICAL CONSUMPTIVE USE

The court first went through the background principles of historical
consumptive use. In general, historical consumptive use is the quantitative measure of a water right, "calculated based upon a pattern of diversion and use over a representative period of time, expressed in acre-feet
of water."" A water right arises when an appropriator puts "a specified
quantity of water to an actual beneficial use,"" decreed as of the time of
15. Id.
16. Id. at 655-56.
17. Id. at 656.
18. Id. at 657.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 656.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 660-61.
24. Id. at 662.
25. Id. at 661 (citing Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1146
(Colo. 2001)).
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appropriation.' Further, the anti-speculation doctrine "prevents unlawful
enlargements," curbs unneeded appropriations, and requires "diligence
in placing water to actual beneficial use."'
The court stated that in a change of right case, the trial court must determine historical consumptive use to maintain "optimum use and reliability" of water resources." It will only approve a change of water right if
no injury will occur to other adjudicated water rights or if it can include
terms and conditions that will prevent an enlargement of historical consumptive use." Central to this determination is that an applicants bear a
"realrisk ofrequantification"of the water rights sought to be changed.'
1. Original Burlington 1885 Decrees
Irrigation appropriations are "limited to the acreage the appropriator
intended to irrigate when the appropriation was made."" The flow rate
on the face of a decree is not the equivalent of historical consumptive
use." Consumptive use in a change proceeding "does not include water
from an undecreed enlargement, even if there has been a long period of
enlarged use."'
The court looked at the language of Burlington's 1885 direct flow decree and its intent at the time of appropriation. On its face, the decree
stated a direct flow water right of 350 cfs and a storage right of 11,000
acre-feet of water." The referee's opinion at the time identified 12,000
acres of lands above the reservoirs for irrigation, with 28,000 acres below
the reservoirs "susceptible to being irrigated" and unlimited potential "as
it may continue to the eastern line of Colorado."' FRICO argued that
this language included land below the current Barr Reservoir in the original decree." The court deferred to the water courts finding that a vague
potential for irrigation on undefined land was insufficient to support a
finding that Burlington made an appropriation for such lands." Burlington, at the time of appropriation, used the direct flow rights solely above
Barr Lake." In addition, the applicants did not provide the water court
with evidence of a different intent." Further, the structures in u'se at the
26. Id. at 662.
27. Id. at 661.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 662.
30. Id. at 662 (quoting Pueblo W. Metro Dist. v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.,
717 P.2d 955, 959 (Colo. 1986) (emphasis added)).
31. Id. at 662.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 662; In re Water Rights of Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 147 P.3d
9, 16 (Colo. 2006).
34. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 664.
35. Id. at 656.
36. Id. at 664.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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time of adjudication could only divert a maximum of 200 cfs." Therefore, FRICO's expansion of the system and use of water on additional
acreage below the lake was an unlawful enlargement and Burlington's
"excess water" was not part of the Companies' historical consumptive
use."
2. The One-Fill Rule
In Colorado, the one-fill rule governs reservoir storage. The court
announced the rule in City of Westminster v. Church," which held that a
reservoir right permits "one fill of the reservoir per year."' However, in
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Ditrict v. Fort Lyon Canal
Co.," the court further interpreted that rule, requiring a change of storage
rights to consider "diminished return flows."" Here, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the water court's conclusion that The Water Right
and Determination and. Administration Act of 1969' ("1969 Act"), required approval of a change of storage right only if no injury would result." In a change case, "storage itself is not a beneficial use," so the
court must determine the amount of actual beneficial use to determine
the "proper consumptive use credit per share in the ditch or reservoir
company."'
In this case, Barr Lake has a capacity of 30,000 acre-feet, but typically
carried-over an average of 11,000 acre-feet of water each year." The
court held that volumetric storage limitations of historical consumptive
use below the reservoir imposed by the water court were appropriate and
consistent with the 1969 Act." The court stated the limitation was proper
because otherwise the changed shares could divert more South Platte
River water to fill the Barr Lake storage right than was historically released and consumed for irrigation below that reservoir." In addition,
applicants failed to meet their burden of showing the change would not
injure junior appropriators;" while opponents presented evidence that the

40. Id.
41. Id.at 665.
42. City of Westminster v. Church, 445 P.2d 52, 58 (1968).
43. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 663.
44. See Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 720 P.2d 133,
146 (Colo. 1986) (holding modifications to decree required to protect against diminished return flows in storage rights cases).
45. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 663.
46. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2011).
47. Burhngton Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 663.
48. Id, at 663.
49. Id. at 667.
50. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37- 9 2-305(4)(a)(II) (2011) ("The relinquishment of part of
the decree for which the change is sought . . . if necessary to prevent an enlargement
upon the historical use or diminution of return flow to the detriment of other appropriators.").
51. Burhngton Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 667-68.
52. Id. at 667.
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proposed change would enlarge historical use, alter historical fill patterns,
and lengthen senior calls on the water.' Thus, the court ruled that the
one-fill rule allowed FRICO one fill of the reservoir once annually in
priority, charging the carry-over storage against the amount of total diversion for the year. In the future, FRICO could not reduce carryover storage and increase water use below the reservoir in excess of historical consumptive use."
The court held that the no injury rule in change of water right cases
"work[s] in concert" with the one-fill rule limit to ensure that a storage
right holder does not enlarge its water right.' Therefore, the court limited FRICO's 1885 storage right to its historical beneficial use on lands
"below Barr Lake prior to FRICO's enlargement of the system."'
3. Study Periods
The court upheld the water court's selection of appropriate study periods for historical consumptive use determinations. The water court
selected time periods for calculations that excluded FRICO's unlawful
enlargement of the Burlington Barr Lake system in 1909 or were susceptible to corrections for FRICO's unlawful uses. For Burlington's 1885
direct flow right, the court used an 1885 to 1909 study period." For Burlington's 1885 storage right, the court used a 1927 to 2004 study period,
excluding deliveries to the enlarged Speer, Neres, and Beebe Canals.'
4. Seepage Water
After FRICO's purchased an interest in the system, it built a drain
system in the embankment of Barr Lake ("toe drains") that collected
about 2 cfs of seepage water from the lake and then delivered it into the
Beebe Canal." During water court proceedings, FRICO's general manager testified that the company installed the toe drain to "lower the saturaFRICO
tion level and mitigate the potential for dam instability."'
claimed the historical use of the water from the toe drains and from
seepage entering the Beebe Canal at other locations.
In ruling against FRICO on this claim, the water court found the
Beebe Canal was a "gaining ditch" that received water from irrigated
lands above the ditch and reservoir seepage." The court.explained the

53. In re Application for Water Rights of Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. (Water
Court), No. 02CW403 at T 556 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. I Sept. 5, 2008).
54. Burington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 668.
55. Id. at 663.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 665-66.
58. Id. at 666.
59. Id. at 658-59.
60. In re Application for Water Rights of Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. (Water
Court), No. 02CW403 at 1 447 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1 Sept. 5, 2008).
61. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 659.
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basic rule that seepage water tributary to a natural watercourse is subject
to appropriation.' Because the original decrees for storage and use below the reservoir did not include the appropriation of seepage waters and
FRICO did not later apply for an appropriation of seepage waters, the
court upheld the water court's exclusion from historical consumptive use
of seepage gains into the Beebe Canal." Therefore, FRICO's actual reservoir releases were the appropriate measure of historical consumptive
use."
B. PRIOR WATER COURT DECREES

FRICO and Thornton both appealed separate water court conclusions that claim preclusion did not bar a ditch-wide determination in the
present case. The court discussed whether historical consumptive use of
rights within the Burlington Barr Lake system was previously determined
by the parties' previous water court decrees.' Under Orr v. Arapahoe
Water and Sanitation District,the court may at a later time determine
historical consumptive use even after a finding tha't "new points of diversion would not injure other appropriators."' When an individual user
changes shares for use at a different location, a later ditch-wide analysis
could then reduce the same user's allocation at the new point down to its
percentage of historical consumptive use at the original diversion."
In the first decree at issue, the water court granted FRICO a new
storage right in addition to its 1885 Burlington right. The appellants unsuccessfully argued that the water court's grant of storage between 19.1
and 34 feet implicitly confirmed the first 19.1 feet for the original 1885
storage right." The court held that the prior decree's assumptions did not
meet the legal standard for claim preclusion and upheld the water courts
calculation of historical consumptive use."
For the second water court decree, Thornton in 1987 changed shares
from irrigation to municipal uses on the Little Burlington system and
received a consumptive use credit of 1,326 acre feet annually." FRICO
argued that the current determination of historical consumptive use for
the system as a whole would injure the quantification of those vested
The water court's previous determination only calculated
rights.
62. Id. at 666.
63. Id. at 666-67.
64. Id. at 667.
65. See id. at 670.
66. Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Colo. 1988).
In Orr, the applicant wanted to change from irrigation to municipal uses, but had previously changed the point of diversion from surface water to wells, where the water court
determined no adverse impact. Id. No evidence of the amount of land irrigated was
presented at the hearing. The court upheld a determination of historical consumptive
use based on past use of the surface ditches. Id.
67. See Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 669.
68. Id. at 669.
69. Id. at 669.
70. Id. at 658.
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Thornton's shares in the Little Burlington system. In this case, the water
court found that the entire 200 cfs under the 1885 Burlington direct flow
water right was attributable to the Little Burlington System above Barr
Lake. Because FRICO historically administered the shares separately
and gave them first priority, those rights were not injured with a subsequent ditch-wide determination." Therefore, claim preclusion did not
bar the court's ditch-wide historical consumptive use determination.
C. NEW STRUCTURES AND POINTS OF DIVERSION

The court analyzed the Metro Districts' delivery of water directly into
the Burlington Barr Lake system below the Burlington headgate and the
Globeville Project's alteration to FRICO's diversion structures on the
South Platte River. The court found that both the source of water and
alterations at the point of diversion constituted undecreed points of diversion and could not count towards historical consumptive use in the
change proceeding.
1. Metro Pumps
First, the court looked at discharges from the Metro District's
wastewater treatment plant. From 1952-1963, the total available water
above the Burlington Headgate included Denver's Northside Wastewater
Treatment Plant's ("Northside"), which annually discharged an average of
When the Metro
68,000 acre-feet into the South Platte River."
Wastewater Plant went into service in 1966, it discharged the treated
wastewater below the Burlington Ditch headgate. The Companies then
unsuccessfully brought an action against the Metro District to prevent the
discharge below the Burlington Headgate." The parties reached a settlement in which the Metro District agreed to install pumps at the plant and
deliver an average of 9,600 acre-feet per year of treated wastewater directly into the Burlington Canal." FRICO sought to include this water in the
historical use of the water rights to be changed. The water court found
however, that "no factual or legal basis" existed for it to include the water
supplied by the Metro Pumps in its calculation of historical consumptive
use."

Englewood and Denver claimed that without the Metro Pumps the
Companies would fill their senior reservoirs more slowly, which in turn,
would delay the time when junior water could divert in priority." The
71. Id. at 670.
72. Id. at 659 (explaining the Companies did not establish how much was legally and
physically available at the Burlington Headgate or how much of the water was actually
diverted).
73. Metro. Den. Sewage Disposal Dist. No. I v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co.,
499 P.2d 1190 (1972).
74. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 659.
75. Id. at 671-72.
76. Id. at 672.
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court held that this was not a cognizable injury because juniors cannot
rely on undecreed diversions for the maintenance of stream conditions."
Further, it rejected the argument that the Metro Pumps simply replicated
the pre-1968 diversions as insufficient, because every appropriation must
go through the administrative process, and the state engineer's acquiescence to the agreement was not enough." Metro District's pumping water
into the canal on the other hand injured Public Service Company's downstream rights because it enlarged upstream water rights." The court held
the pumps were an "alternate point of diversion limited to the amount of
water legally and physically available at the headgate," which excluded the
entire 9,600 acre-feet of agreement water from historical consumptive
use."
2. Globeville Flood Control Project
Second, the court looked at whether flood control changes to the
South Platte River at the Burlington headgate constituted a change in
point of diversion."' The court explained that under Colorado statutory
law," a change occurs whenever an appropriator removes or controls water. The applicants argued that the alterations on the South Platte River
were similar to those in Downing v. Copeland, where the appropriator
constructed a channel within the streambed to control and move water
towards its headgate.' In Downing, the court held that because the construction only moved water towards the appropriator's original headgate it
did not require court authorization as a new point of diversion." Here,
new headgates capable of diverting 1000 cfs, as compared to 700 cfs, controlled the diversion and directed the water into a channel hydrologically
separated from the river." The old. Burlington headgate only prevented
overflow.' The Companies also argued that the new headgate was a permitted upstream extension of the original diversion," but the court added
protective conditions because "larger and more effective diversions"
would injure vested rights on the over-appropriated South Platte River."
The court held that the new headgate and concrete chanel constituted
an undecreed point of diversion.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 673.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(7) (2011).
Downing v. Copeland, 249 P.2d 539, 540 (Colo. 1952).
Id.
Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 673.
Id. at 660.
See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-86-11 (2010).
Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d at 674.
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D. RESUME NOTICE AND THE SCOPE OF THE WATER COURT'S
DECISION

FRICO's change application included more shares than it currently
sought. One of the purposes of a ditch-wide determination was so
FRICO shareholders could transfer their rights into the Project at a later
date without separately litigating an entirely new change case. On appeal,
the FRICO shareholders who did not include their shares in the application argued that the court had no jurisdiction to re-quantify those shares
unless and until they applied for a change and the water court's ruling
could only bind those shares if and when they were subject to a change of
use application."
Specifically, Henrylyn argued that its rights should not be affected because it entered into a stipulation agreement with Aurora, Central, and
Englewood, which the water court approved, that stated the determination of historical consumptive use did not apply to its FRICO and Burlington shares." The court held that the published notice of the application was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the water court over all of the
FRICO and Burlington water rights at issue and a stipulation would not
determine the state's administration of water rights under court decrees."

IV. ANALYSIS/DISCUSSION
The outcome in this case severely restricted FRICO's water rights for
the Barr Lake System and deprived shareholders of what they believed
were their decreed water rights. The applicants failed to produce evidence that the changes requested would not injure other appropriators on
the South Platte River. Following is an analysis of the court's holding and
how it may affect future agricultural transfers to municipal use.
A. CONTINUOUS USE AND EXPECTATIONS

The court's basic premise is that expanded use cannot ripen into a
water right, no matter how long it is continued. In this case, FRICO believed it had purchased 150 cfs of "excess" water and put it to beneficial
use under the original decree, and had done so for almost one hundred
years. This continued use for an extended period could not ripen into a
water right, but the court's decision limiting diversions may alter historical stream conditions and expectations along the South Platte River.
FRICO was unable to prove to the water court that Burlington intended to irrigate land below Barr Lake at the time it appropriated the
1885 water rights. The court focused on Burlington's lack of intent to
irrigate additional lands because it had sold FRICO the rights before ever
using them. However, water rights are generally transferable and owners
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 675.
Id. at 676
Id. at 677.
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can sell them for a profit. Burlington's choice to sell may have been a
reasonable business decision and efficient allocation of the burdens of
water supply system development costs at the time. FRICO and Burlington together exercised the full extent of the decreed rights, so FRICO
could simply have perfected the appropriation initiated by Burlington
when it delivered water to lands below Barr Lake.
If this was the intent of that transaction, the parties did not aid their
case with the "excess" language in their agreement, because even at that
time a senior appropriator could not "lend, rent, or sell any excess water
after completing the irrigation of the land for which the water was appropriated."" However, when the district court adjudicated the 1909 storage
right, it assumed that FRICO's use under the 1885 decree was proper.'
At that time, other appropriators on the South Platte River could have
introduced evidence of unlawful enlargement or injury, but did not do so.
The issue was not decided then - and without clear evidence of intent at
the time of the original decree - the court deferred to the water court's
findings and subtracted FRICO's expansion of the 1885 rights from historical consumptive use.
B. METRO AGREEMENT

As described above, the court upheld the water court's decision that
treated sewage from the Metro Pumps could not be included in the historical consumptive use calculation. FRICO argued that the agreement
replicated historical stream conditions prior to the relocation of the
wastewater treatment plant. The water court rejected the argument because undecreed alternate points of diversions are not "retroactively justified" to maintain stream conditions." Additionally, the water court worried that recognizing this agreement would create an incentive for acts
"outside of the statutory change of water right process and subsequently
grandfather in such changes.""
This outcome, however, takes away from the parties' practical solution. The court had previously held that FRICO did not have a vested
right in the location of sewage return flows.' If FRICO had no vested
right to the location of sewage return flows, on what basis could it claim a
new point of diversion for its water rights from a source it had no vested
right to receive? Its right to delivery by means of the Metro Pumps into
the Burlington Canal was a private agreement that replicated the water
92. Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 183 P.2d
552, 554 (Colo. 1947) (emphasis added); see also Fort Lyon v. Chew 33 Colo. 392, 81 P.
37, 39 (1905) (holding owners' exchange or loaning of water rights were limited to decreed volume and could not injure other appropriators).
93. See Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co., 256 P.3d.at 669-70.
94. In re Application for Water Rights of Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. (Water
Court), No. 02CW403 at 1 172 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1 Sept. 5, 2008).
95. Id.
96. See Metro. Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. No. I v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 499 P.2d 1190, 1193 (Colo. 1972).
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supply at the existing Burlington point of diversion. Further, other appropriators on the river would not be injured because they also could not
obtain a vested right to the location of sewage return flows. Therefore,
the court could limit the water rights represented by shares to historical
consumptive use absent the Metro Pumps deliveries when changing their
use.
The court stressed that appropriators must adjudicate all alternate
points of diversion and therefore will probably not take outside circumstances or agreements into account in the future.
C. SEEPAGE GAINS OF WASTEWATER

The court focused on whether the water right decree's terms included
the appropriation of seepage gains. Alternatively, the court might have
analyzed the dam drainage as irrigation wastewater that never left
FRICO's control. Return flow is "irrigation water seeping back to a
stream after it has gone underground to do its nutritional function," while
waste water is water carried in a ditch and then wasted into a stream." In
that circumstance, FRICO could install a toe drain in order to cease wasting the water based on the court's reasoning in City of Boulder v. Boulder & Left Hand Ditch Company because downstream appropriators
have no right to the continuation of waste water.' The toe drains FRICO
built into the dam to capture water may be different than collection of
seepage water in Lamont v. Riverside, because here the water never left
FRICO's control." The appropriator in that case needed a separate appropriation for seepage after it migrated though the soil below the dam
and percolated to the surface.'" If FRICO had stopped the seepage instead of draining it from the base of the dam to promote stability, FRICO
could have used that water because it would remain in storage. Here, the
drain FRICO cut in the base of the dam does not necessarily return the
water into the natural stream because the company measures and directs
the flow into its canal for beneficial use below the reservoir."'
In addition to holding FRICO did not have a vested right to the seepage below Barr Lake, the water court concluded that delivering the seepage and replacing seepage losses in storage, per the decrees terms,
amounted to double counting." Thus, FRICO's use would exceed the
decree if it counted the water delivered into the Beebe canal as a loss
against reservoir storage. Overall, FRICO's delivery of water from the
97. City of Boulder v. Boulder & Left Hand Ditch Co., 557 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Colo.
1976).
98. Id. ("(Dluty to prevent, as far as possible, all waste of the water which they have
appropriated.").
99. Lamont v. Riverside Irrigation Dist., 498 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Colo. 1972) (holding
Seepage water was distinguishable from irrigation waste water).
100. Id. at 1152.
101. In re Application for Water Rights of Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. (Water
Court), No. 02CW403 at 1 447 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Water Div. 1 Sept. 5, 2008).
102. Id. 1 452.
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toe drain into the Beebe Canal promoted conservation and was similar to
a reservoir release.
D. LIMITING WATER STORAGE RIGHTS TO RESERVOIR RELEASES
Maintaining stream conditions and preventing injury to vested rights
is a part of all change cases." If a change of a water storage right increases historical use, then the court must include conditions that prevent injury. However, a rule that limits storage rights to historical releases for
beneficial use may have some unintended results. The court stopped
short of declaring this rule applied to all cases, but the opinion made the
analysis possible in most cases and opponents will certainly use this decision to limit storage rights.
One major issue is how this rule could affect the administration of
storage rights. One of the principal values of a reservoir is to store water
in times of plentiful supplies for use in dry years. Under the Court's decision one could argue that the owner of a storage right cannot annually
drain a reservoir that historically carried over a portion of its water for
use in dry years. This rule creates a disincentive to conservation storage.
To maximize historical use, reservoir owners may begin to release all
water annually to ensure they maximize their historical use, Which would
eliminate much of the benefit of this reservoir storage. The duty of water
in Colorado prevents waste and mitigates some of this danger," but increased use up to the standard of waste would damage the pure conservation function of reservoirs and limit the flexibility of rights."
A second issue relates to when outside factors affect the release of
stored water. The Rio Grande Water Users Association's amicus brief
raised concerns over the Rio Grande Compact, which may distort historical beneficial use of water storage rights in the Rio Grande Basin." The
conservation function of carryover storage is essential for Colorado to
utilize the water apportioned to Colorado under the Compact."' The use
of water from storage in the Rio Grande Project in New Mexico affects
when and how Colorado's post-compact water storage right holders can
103. See Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Colo.
1988) (holding limitation of historical consumptive use read into every water decree by
implication).
104. See Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629,
634 (Colo. 1954) (The duty of water "is that measure of water, which, by careful management and use, without wastage, is reasonably required to be applied to any given tract
of land for such period of time as may be adequate to produce therefrom a maximum
amount of such crops as ordinarily are grown thereon.").
105. Brief for The City of Westminster at 9, Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co.
v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256 P.3d 645 (Colo. 2011) (No. 2009SA 133).
106. COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-66-101 (2011) (agreement between the state of Colorado,
the state of New Mexico, and the state of Texas); Brief for the Rio Grande Water Users
Association at 6, Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256 P.3d 645 (Colo. 2011) (No. 2009SA133) ("Rio Grande Water Users
Association").
107. Rio Grande Water Users Association, supra note 106, at 6.
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be exercised. Thus, looking at historical reservoir releases alone would
deprive Colorado of the benefits it obtained under the Rio Grande Compact." The court did not rule on the issue, but noted that these specific
concerns would be analyzed as they arose."
Overall, this new rule potentially makes the one-fill rule insignificant
in a change of storage rights case. The one-fill rule still applies in Colorado for the administration of reservoirs, but a historical consumptive use
determination will always be less than or equal to the storage right.
Therefore, the court may need to clarify whether historical consumptive
use was a condition in this case to prevent injury or whether historical
consumptive use is always the limit of a storage right.
E. FUTURE DITCH-WIDE DETERMINATIONS IN CHANGE CASES

Shareholders in a mutual ditch company may look more carefully at
change of water rights applications that involve a so-called ditch-wide
analysis of historical use. A possibly significant reduction in their water
rights from such a change prosecuted by other shareholders may discourage ditch-wide change of water rights analyses. Ditch-wide determinations could result in drying up large areas of land because agreements to
change water rights will only be reached if a sufficient voting portion of
the ditch is in favor of selling their rights. Therefore, the economy of
entire farming communities may not survive a change case. Henrylyn
argued that COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-92-305(4) only allows terms and
conditions oi water "subject to change" or "for which change is sought.""o
When the court allocates rights to water in proportion to an owner's
shares in a ditch company, it does not take into account the individual's
consumptive and beneficial use of the water.' Ditch-wide methodology
under Williams v. Midway Ranches required that the same quantification
methodology govern future change proceedings, unless circumstances
changed."' Therefore, a court proceeding is still required when a shareholder wishes to transfer their right, based on the previously determined
form of calculation from the ditch-wide case.
Stipulations between adverse parties help create fair and efficient
transfers. Would the court enforce an agreement between parties that
limited any change to non-transferred rights? For example, the parties
involved could settle concerns of increased use in a way that would not
affect other shareholders until they changed the specific water rights.
This case seems to point towards no. If the court finds that a ditch com-

108. Id. at 13, 15.
109. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist.,
256 P.3d 645, 667 n.13 (Colo. 2011).
110. Brief of Henrylyn Irrigation Dist. at *7, Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co.
v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist., 256 P.3d 645 (Colo. 2011) (No. 2009SA 133),
2010 WL 3973553.
111. See id. at 15.
112. Id. at 16.
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pany enlarged its rights during a ditch-wide determination, then the court
would limit the amount of diversion in priority to what is legally available
at that company's headgate.

V. CONCLUSION
Applicants for a change of water right bear the risk of requantification
of the water rights that are subject to the application. Agricultural transfers to municipal uses will continue, but large mutual ditch companies
and other water providers with common diversions have the potential to
lose in these transactions. When a number of shareholders seek ditchwide analysis, the court will quantify the entire water right at issue because the court applies historical consumptive use to every decree at the
point of diversion. Further, those shareholders that oppose a ditch-wide
determination don not appear to have any legal basis to stop the ditchwide analysis once the Applicant puts the Company's water rights at issue.
Adjudicating all shares may make future transfers more efficient, but it
can have harsh and unfair effects on farmers who do not change their
rights. The increased value of readily changeable water rights benefits
ditch shareholders financially. However, the court's historical consumptive use determination may force farmers to immediately sell their rights
if the per-share determination reduces the water rights to an amount that
is insufficient to maintain economically feasible farming operations.

